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The New Balkan Revolts: From Protests to Plenums, and Beyond* 
 
Igor Štiks and Srećko Horvat 
 
 
Over the last couple of years we have regularly witnessed popular protests and uprisings 
in the post-socialist Balkans. The well-known mobilisations, struggles and street violence 
in the southern part of the peninsula, in Greece and Turkey, have a constant and yet 
under-reported echo in other Balkan states. These have had a different historical 
trajectory: after the disappearance of the state socialist regimes, in all of these states, and 
most dramatically across the former Yugoslavia, a period of violence, conflict or general 
instability and economic hardship has been followed by a seemingly endless transition to 
liberal democracy and a neoliberal economy.  
Transition was meant to be a process ending in accession to the European Union. 
But now the EU itself seems to be a project without a clear direction and whose prospects 
are uncertain: continuing austerity measures, multiple “crises”, from economic to 
institutional ones, rising unemployment rates, especially among the youth, and a growing 
right-wing extremism from Greece, France to Hungary. In accordance with Thatcherite 
ideals, the European welfare state is now almost completely dismantled, labour laws are 
regressing to the early years of the 20th century, and public services have been gradually 
privatised. The political regimes in the Balkans have been following this general 
European trend with similar disastrous results. However, today in many of these states 
they are for the first time facing a serious resistance coming directly from the streets.   
These new social movements reflect a need for a deep transformation of Balkan 
societies. Given the multi-faceted situation described above, it is unsurprising that the 
movements differ in their methods of struggle, their ideological orientations and their 
strategies. They are mostly a reaction to the deteriorating social and economic situation 
and numerous abuses of power by corrupt political elites. Nonetheless, they often serve 
as hubs for new ideas and more proactive projects offering a progressive vision of their 
societies. In this article we will sketch a typology of these movements and actions by 
dividing them into five main blocs: anti-regime protests, mobilisations for the commons, 
student movements, workers’ struggles and, last but not least, hegemonic cultural and 
intellectual efforts.  
 
From Anti-Regime Protests to the Struggle for the Commons 
 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, anti-regime protests have been erupting 
regularly across the Balkans. In Croatia in Spring 2011, for a whole month, up to 10,000 
people were marching across Zagreb every evening denouncing the political system and 
all political parties. In Slovenia in 2012 and 2013 general “uprisings” mobilised the 
whole country, contributing to the fall of the right-wing government and a number of 
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corrupt officials. In Bulgaria in spring 2013 huge protests triggered by drastically 
increased electricity bills brought thousands to the streets only to be followed after the 
general elections by even larger protests in summer 2013. For weeks masses protested 
against political elites and their ties to powerful mafia and media moguls. In Romania 
protests have been sporadically erupting since 2010, in response to unbearable social 
conditions and continuing austerity measures. Similar types of protests, with different 
intensity, have been seen also in Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania.  
Probably the most important social upheaval in the post-socialist Balkans erupted in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in February 2014. Only eight months after the 2013 protests that 
for the first time significantly transcended imposed ethnic divisions, on 5 February 2014 
workers from several privatised and destroyed factories united on the streets of Tuzla to 
demand their unpaid salaries and pensions. Soon, they were joined by students and other 
citizens from all walks of life. Clashes with police resulted in burning of government 
buildings in Tuzla, which was replicated in other cities such as Mostar, Zenica and 
Sarajevo. And while the media and political class were denouncing “hooliganism” and 
“vandalism”, the protesters were busy establishing “plenums”, self-governed citizens’ 
assemblies that spread throughout the country, from Tuzla itself where the first plenum 
was formed, to the capital Sarajevo, regional centres such as Mostar and Zenica, and to 
smaller cities such as Bugojno, Bihać, Brčko, Travnik and others. Most canton 
governments resigned and cantons’ assemblies mostly accepted — the implementation 
remains another issue — the main demands by the plenums. After long deliberations 
open to all citizens, almost uniformly, with some regional variety, they demanded the 
revision of privatisations, the end of excessive politicians’ benefits, and the formation of 
new state-level and local governments filled with people with proven expertise and no 
record of corruption.  
In our view, the plenums of Bosnia represent the most radical experiment in non-
institutional politics that can be found across the Balkans since the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. The form is clearly radical, although the participants themselves are of 
various political stripes and cannot be easily identified as left-leaning or belonging to the 
left. Enraged citizens simply rebelled against the degrading conditions of social and 
political life and spontaneously adopted citizens’ assemblies and horizontal forms of 
democracy as a way to articulate their demands and organise themselves autonomously. 
The plenum movement shook the foundation of post-war Bosnia and the wider post-
Yugoslav region, surprised both ethnonationalist political elites and the international 
community and opened new spaces for social and political action. The plenums were 
operational, with various successes depending on the local situation, for almost three 
months. In various forms, via working groups, many plenums are still active. Engaged 
citizens understand now that plenums represent a precious instrument that can be easily 
reactivated. To sum up, a growing social movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina came out of 
the protests and the plenums and re-defined the public sphere and imposed a new political 
agenda, this time centred on the question of social justice and equality coupled with a 
profound critique of the disastrous capitalist economy implemented in this post-conflict 
country. 
 All these examples — and the Bosnian one especially — show that for the first 
time we have more than an anti-government rhetoric per se – instead there is a true anti-
Regime sentiment. Not only the state but the whole apparatus on which the current 
oligarchy is based is called into question by sometimes chaotically self-organised 
citizens. The emergence and nature of these protests invites us to rethink the categories 
used to explain the social, political and economic situation in the Balkans, and elsewhere 
in post-socialist Eastern Europe. It also compels us to understand the nature not only of 
state institutions, their weakness or failure, but the nature of the post-socialist Regime 
that has been (almost) cemented over the last two decades but susceptible to crack under 
the weight of its own contradictions and products such as, for instance, rampant poverty. 
Rebelling against these Regimes is all that much harder because they often do not have a 
single face, no dictator, no governing families and are not characterised by open 
repression and censorship. These occasional expressions of anger are indeed the seeds of 
a new political and social dynamics that might result in wider movements. However, they 
are also characterised by volatility and by random triggers, and are usually followed by 
confusing and often contradictory political messages.  
One of the most developed areas of struggle concerns the commons, the defence 
of public and common goods such as public spaces (often parks), nature (water, forests, 
hills, landscape), urban spaces and public utility infrastructure (electricity, railways etc.) 
Examples are abundant: The Right to the City movement in 2009/2010 in Zagreb 
mobilised thousands in defence of a square in downtown Zagreb; in Dubrovnik citizens 
organised to defend a nearby hill from being turned into a golf resort; in Bosnia’s second 
largest city, Banja Luka, citizens tried to defend one of the few public parks; in Belgrade 
smaller mobilisations were triggered by cutting old trees in one of the main streets, so to 
obtain more parking space, or by destruction of a neighbourhood park; in Bulgaria in 
2012 people demonstrated against privatisation of forests; in Romania in 2012 against 
privatisation of emergency services, and again against an ecologically disastrous gold 
mine project in Rosia Montana etc. These single-issue movements proved to be channels 
of general public dissatisfaction and enjoyed support from the vast majority of citizens 
who see privatisations of the commons or neglect of public interest as intolerable 
practices. The commercialisation of public education, what many see as the ultimate 
common and social good, triggered massive student mobilisations as well. 
 
Back to the old Alliance: Students, Workers, and Intellectuals? 
 
Since 2009 strong student movements have developed in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and to 
a certain extent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and, recently, Kosovo. While 
students mostly protest in classic ways in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo 
(by marches, protests and petitions), in Slovenia, Serbia and, especially, in Croatia the 
student movement extensively experiments with occupations and direct democracy. It is 
precisely the emergence of plenums within these movements to which we can trace the 
current Bosnian practices of direct and horizontal democracy.  
In this context, it is worth paying special attention to the Croatian case, where an 
independent student movement articulated a strong resistance to the privatisation and 
commercialisation of higher education. Their protest against neoliberal reforms in the 
field of education turned into probably the first strong political opposition not only to the 
government, but indeed to the general political and social regime. During 35 days in 
spring and two weeks in autumn in 2009, more than 20 universities all over Croatia were 
occupied with students practically running them.1 In itself nothing new one could say, but 
the way they occupied and ran the universities deserves our attention for its originality in 
a much larger context than that of the Balkans or Eastern Europe. They invited to their 
plenums not only students but all citizens to debate issues of public importance such as 
education and, in addition to that, to decide upon the course of the protest movement. The 
most active plenum at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb each 
evening gathered up to 1000 individuals deliberating on the course of action.2 This event 
gave rise to the movement for direct democracy, which was seen as a necessary 
corrective of electoral democracy and partitocracy and, possibly, a true alternative to it.  
The new Croatian Left, whose ideas quickly spread around the post-Yugoslav 
space, do not see direct democracy limited to the referendum practice but rather as a 
means of political organisation for citizens from local communes to the national level. 
This horizontal model has been used since then by many collective actions across post-
Yugoslav space, from Occupy movements to street marches, workers’ strikes, and 
farmers’ protests, and, finally, on a larger scale, by protestors in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The recent period is also marked by reinvigorated workers’ struggles. They are 
not uniform and range from classic strikes, workers’ influence in running companies in 
majority state ownership and defending them from further privatisations (Petrokemija 
factory in Croatia), to examples of workers’ successful and unsuccessful takeovers (e.g. 
Jadrankamen and TDZ  in Croatia) and the models of workers’ share-holdership 
(Jugoremedija in Serbia and ITAS in Croatia). We are also witnessing a new cooperation 
between different social movements (such as students) and workers in building a 
common anti-capitalist strategy.  
Finally, there is another type of struggle deserving of attention: namely, 
hegemonic cultural and intellectual efforts whose aim is to change the general public 
climate, dominant media discourses, and re-introduce progressive ideas into wider 
society. Its primary goal is to undermine the (neo)liberal hegemony that since 1989 has 
successfully delegitimised left traditions and promoted electoral democracy—although 
often ending up in autocracies—and the free market as the only game in town. In the 
post-Yugoslav context, this general post-socialist orientation was coupled, not always 
harmoniously, with nationalist-conservative, right-wing extremist and anti-communist 
dominance. It clashed though with liberal attempts at “democratising” these societies; the 
efforts focused mostly on institutional reforms and EU integration process that 
problematised only criminal privatisations and practices—but not the general neoliberal 
orientation.  
Introducing a progressive agenda and radical thinking into the dominant discourse 
was an almost impossible task until recently. However, the 2008 economic and financial 
shock, followed by the crisis of the EU, opened a space for until then marginal 
movements to articulate their critique of the current political and economic regime. These 
                                                        
1 We have written extensively about the student and civic rebellions that involved occupation of 
universities but also of public spaces in Zagreb in our book Pravo na pobunu – Uvod u anatomiju 
građanskog otpora [The Right to Rebellion - An Introduction to the Anatomy of Civic Resistance], Zagreb: 
Fraktura, 2010. 
2 For a detailed overview of the student actions in Croatia see The Occupation Cookbook, or the Model of 
the Occupation of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb, Minorcompositions: New 
York, 2011. 
attempts range from public gatherings, forums and festivals (such as the Mayday school 
in Ljubljana, the Subversive Festival in Zagreb or Open University in Sarajevo), summer 
schools, series of activist and academic workshops and conferences to newspapers, 
reviews and online magazines (from Zarez, Bilten, and Le Monde Diplomatique in 
Croatia to CriticAtac and LeftEast in Romania, or Mladina in Ljubljana).  
 
Movements, Plenums, Parties 
 
The political strategies of the movements described above remain for now confined to 
occasional protests and occupations — often marked by questioning of representative 
democracy in the name of horizontality — petitions and even referendum initiatives. 
Although, the model offered by Greek left party Syriza, a coalition of movements 
engaged in parliamentary politics, is widely appreciated, we cannot detect so far serious 
attempts at taking these struggles towards institutional politics.3 
Nonetheless, what the current protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly show is 
that protest energy can soon vanish and turn into an even bigger despair, usual 
fragmentation, or what Walter Benjamin called the “melancholy of the Left”. But, if 
protests turn into some sort of institutionalised politics — be it the self-created parallel 
institutions such as citizens-led assemblies and/or new political parties that are ready to 
face electoral struggles — the progressive movements’ potential for a wider social and 
political impact can remain strong. Without the protests, the plenums would lose their 
potential to apply pressure, and without the plenums, the protests would lose their 
legitimacy and articulation. In turn, any future attempt at party and representative politics 
will have to be based on, inspired and guided by social movements. In other words, what 
the Left, in order to get out of its “current impotence”, must rethink is the complex 
dialectics between the 3 Ps: protests, plenums, parties. Instead of being overwhelmed by 
new ‘spring(s)’, what we need more than ever is a long-term political and social work 
that will combine all organisational forms and be open to changing local and global 
circumstances.  
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Maybe the only noteworthy exception, among a number of small left-leaning parties, so far is a political 
party in Slovenia (Initiative for Democratic Socialism) that grew from street protests. It formed, together 
with other progressive left parties, a “United Left” list of candidates for the European elections in May 
2014 but failed to elect a MEP. Only two months later at the national elections in Slovenia, the United Left 
won six seats in the Parliament. 
